We propose a mechanism for eliciting honest responses to a multiple choice question (MCQ) when the truthfulness cannot be directly verified. Our choice-matching mechanisms rewards each respondent with a score consisting of his score for predicting the answers of other respondents, and of the average prediction score of the respondents who give the same response to the MCQ. The mechanism is truth-inducing when the beliefs of the respondents with the same truthful answers are sufficiently similar. We argue they are more suitable for practical implementation than existing alternatives. Furthermore, choice-matching is a general method for making stated preferences incentive-compatible, by linking them to revealed ones.
Introduction
A firm that wants to learn about how its customers value a new product, a government agency asking external experts to evaluate the long-term impact of a policy, and an economist working with self-reported panel-data, all need to rely on claims made by individuals whose honesty or diligence in answering may be questionable.
In this paper, 1 we propose a new class of incentive-compatible "choice-matching" mechanisms for situations like these. Mechanisms of this type reward each respondent with a score, and, if the respondents want to maximize the expected reward, and if the score is incentive compatible, they will respond truthfully. In practice, respondents are often close to indifferent between truthful and random responses and incentive compatible mechanisms can break this indifference.
Our idea is to link explicit opinions and judgments, or "type-declarations," with an auxilliary game that reveals types, but only implicitly via a separating equilibrium with respect to some other action. In our canonical example, type-declarations are made by answering a multiple choice question (MCQ), and the auxilliary game asks the respondents to predict how often each answer was taken by all other respondents. Predictions are then scored for accuracy using a standard proper scoring rule, and answers to the MCQ are credited with the average prediction accuracy score of all respondents who endorsed that particular answer. We prove that this mechanism is truth-inducing under standard assumptions, namely, that respondents are risk-neutral Bayesian maximizers who have a common prior and update their beliefs in an impersonal fashion. However, the guiding idea behind choice-matching is more general, and the auxilliary game can involve other types of questions or actions.
Incentives for non-verifiable MCQs based on respondents' predictions of the answer distribution were first introduced by Prelec (2004) , with the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) mechanism. Under BTS scoring, every strict Bayes-Nash equilibrium is type separating (Cvitanić et al., 2016) for samples greater than a number that is dependent on the common prior, which the planner may not know. This large sample requirement along with the non-transparent nature of the BTS scoring formula has stimulated search for alternatives, especially in the computer science community (e.g.
Witkowski and Parkes, 2012a, Faltings, 2014, Zhang and Chen, 2014) . 2 Like these approaches, ours works with small samples. Its major practical advantages are the simplicity of the scoring principle and robustness with respect to underlying assumptions.
In the next section, we illustrate choice-matching using the example of consumer evaluations of a trial product. In section 3, we present the model and the main results and contrast our method to alternatives. In section 4, we explain how the choice-matching payment rules can be used without asking for predictions of other respondents' answers. For instance, we can ask for predictions of a verifiable random variable (such as GDP or future sales) if it is plausible that these predictions should be correlated with the answers to the MCQ. Going beyond prediction, a generalized version of choice-matching can deal with the situations in which the true answers are entirely determined by preferences and not by beliefs. In the appendix, we construct a budget-balanced versions of the mechanism.
Suppose that a firm hopes to launch a new product and surveys a sample of respondents to evaluate a trial version.
After a testing phase, respondents are asked to provide a rating on a scale from 1 to 5. The firm would like to know the true percentage of each of the five ratings, but may be worried that respondents might not provide honest responses, for lack of effort, or because they feel obliged to endorse the product. The firm wants to design a mechanism that assigns a score to each respondent such that he maximizes his (expected) score by responding truthfully, given that everyone else tells the truth. The rules based only on the responses to the MCQ cannot achieve this goal (Radanovic and Faltings, 2013; Cvitanić, et al. 2017 ). Therefore, the MCQ must be supplemented with an auxiliary question. In the canonical version of choice-matching, this auxiliary question asks each respondent to predict the share of each of the five ratings submitted by other respondents in the sample. Respondents are then matched to the respondents who choose the same answer to the original question. the average prediction score achieved by the respondents other than r who report the same rating as respondent r, if any. If any rating is not chosen by at least one respondent other than r, r (and everyone else) receives a score of zero.
Otherwise, if all five ratings are given by at least one respondent other than r, respondent r receives
with λ ∈ (0, 1) an arbitrary weight chosen by the survey planner.
Why might we expect this payment formula to be truth-inducing? For example, with two states of nature, the tested product has high quality and it has low quality, in the high-quality state we should expect a larger share of higher ratings and the difference between the two states should be especially pronounced at the extremes. In this case, the respondents who evaluate the product differently should have different beliefs about the distribution of ratings. A respondent who rates the product at a 5, should evaluate the-high-quality world as more likely than a respondent who rates the product at a 4 and much more likely than a respondent who rates the product at a 1.
If one's rating is the only piece of evidence to distinguish between the two states, the beliefs of those respondents with the same rating should be (roughly) identical. When facing the above incentives, each respondent should therefore expect that those respondents with the same rating will -on average -score higher. This provides the desired truthtelling incentives: Since we use strictly proper scoring rules to construct S, every respondent has incentives to provide their true prediction. Furthermore, since each respondent should expect that those respondents who provide the same rating get the highest prediction scores, they have an incentive to be honest with regard to the MCQ as well.
Model and Results

Uniqueness of truthful equilibrium
Let us first address an issue common to our and other mechanisms that aim to elicit truthful equilibrium in surveys:
the lack of uniqueness. For example, in a modification of the truthful equilibrium of the previous section, all those who believe the rating is 1 could declare rating 2, and vice versa, and that would still be a strictly separating equilibrium.
However, in applications respondents are often indifferent between telling the truth or not, or slightly leaning towards not telling the truth (e.g., "being nice" in marketing surveys or teaching evaluations). The fact that they would get a reward in our and similar mechanisms would then make a big difference, It also may increase the participation rate when respondents are self-selected, as for example, in online reviews. In implementation, the respondents are usually nudged by being told that it is in their interest to tell the truth if everyone else does. Since our mechanism has the advantage of being easier to explain to respondents, it may help to nudge them more easily to truth-telling, because, by understanding it better, they might find it more credible, and feel intuitively that, indeed, truth-telling is an equilibrium . Finally, let us mention that, using the same arguments as Cvitani'c et al (2017) used for BTS, it can be shown that with infinitely many respondents, the only possible strict equilibria are either strictly separating (i.e., type permutations) or those in which at least one type is not claimed (in which case everyone gets zero). Assumptions A1-A4 below are sufficient, but not necessary, for choice-matching to be honesty-inducing. Subsection 3.4 discusses ways in which they can be relaxed.
Setup
Assumption 1. Common prior. There exists a common prior on the distribution of x-types in the population. That is, it is common knowledge among individuals that for all respondents r, we have
for some probability measure P (·) and the corresponding expectation operator E [·].
Importantly, this assumption does not imply that the survey planner knows the prior P .
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Assumption 2. Non-degeneracy. For any respondent r and any realization t r :
Each r believes that with positive probability each answer to the MCQ is the x-type of at least one other respondent.
While non-degeneracy is a technical assumption, it cannot be relaxed without changing our method substantially. Our method thus requires a minimal amount of care in the survey design: the planner should not include MCQ answer options for which she thinks respondents might have zero probability to be endorsed by at least one person.
To simplify notation, we write y r,k for the conditional expectation E
. This is r's expectation of the average x-type -conditioning on E r -when r's true answer to the MCQ is k ∈ A. We then assume:
Assumption 3. Stochastic relevance. For any two respondents r, s and any answer options, k, ℓ ∈ A:
Stochastic relevance is a relatively mild requirement (Miller et al., 2005) . Essentially, it states that there is something to learn about the responses of others from your own response. For our main result, we also assume the converse of stochastic relevance:
Assumption 4. Impersonal updating. For any two respondents r, s and any answer option k ∈ A:
Impersonal updating is a more demanding assumption, stating that all respondents who share the same x-type have identical predictions about the population percentages. Under a common prior and Bayesian updating, it is implied when individual x-types follow a multinomial distribution. In such a model, we can imagine that there is a general population with unknown frequencies p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p M ) of each type and respondents think of themselves as a random draw from this overall population. 
Inducing Honesty via Choice-Matching
In this subsection we assume that assumptions A1-A4 hold. Then, we can model the strategic setting induced by our scoring rule as a Bayesian game. As such, a respondents' true answer to the MCQ completely determines his type, because y r is computed by Bayesian updating. In this game, a pure strategy for respondent r is a function σ(
that maps his type to a response (x r , y r ). The profile of all respondents' pure strategies is denoted σ(t), with entries σ r (t r ), and the profile excluding player r is denoted σ −r (t −r ). We consider only pure strategies and suppose that each respondent maximizes the expected value of his score, conditional on his type.
Given a real-valued scoring rule R(σ r (t r ), σ −r (t −r )), we call a set of response strategies a (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium, NE, if, for any-responses (x, y) ̸ = (σ r (t r )), we have
That is, by deviating in responses (x, y), player r would be worse off (in expectation) than by not deviating. If the inequality is strict we speak of a strict NE. An NE is strict in x if the inequality is strict whenever x ̸ = σ r x (t r ) and, analogously, it is strict in y if the inequality is strict whenever y ̸ = σ r y (t r ).
We 
There are infinitely many functions f (.) which satisfy inequality 3.2, most notably the quadratic scoring rule f (p; j) =
i and the logarithmic scoring rule f (p; j) = log p j . In the latter case, 3.2 is known as the Gibbs inequality. Next, for variables x 1 j , ...,x N j , j = 1, ..., I where x s j takes value 1 for some j and value 0 otherwise, we let:
for a given SPSR f .
Definition 3.
Consider a respondent r who declares k to be his true answer. Let f be a strictly proper scoring rule and S as defined in 3.3. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), a payment rule R S,λ induces choice-matching if (a) In the event M r :
is the average prediction score achieved by the respondents other than r who submit x s = x r :
In words, if all M possible answers are declared by at least one respondent other than r, choice-matching assigns him a score that is a weighted average of his own prediction score and the prediction score of those respondents who declare the same x-choice. Otherwise, he receives zero.
We now come to the main result of the paper. Proof. By the construction of S, choice-matching is incentive compatible in y. To see that choice-matching is also incentive compatible in x, fix a respondent r with honest answer k. We only need to considerS −r . Suppose that all the players other than r provide truthful responses and predictions. The difference in the expected score for player r between not deviating and deviating from t r to some other response x r with x r i = 1 is:
Furthermore, due to impersonal updating and via construction of Therefore, non-zero scores are possible only if there is a uniform distribution over answers. As this is common knowledge, all predictions will be uniform irrespective of respondent type, eliminating choice-matching incentives.
Robustness: No common prior
When not assuming common prior, we adjust the definition of incentive compatibility similarly as Witkowski and Parkes (2012b), Radanovic and Faltings (2014) and Baillon (2017) . We call a rule R incentive compatible if: 
for any respondents r, s and s ′ , and for all k, k
That is, posteriors of two respondents with the same x-type can differ, but they still agree more (as measured by d) than for two individuals with different x-types. Put differently, respondents may bring different information about the distribution of x-types to the survey, but the information about their own honest response has more weight than the differences with respect to the remaining information. We exploit such a structure via a well-known relationship between scoring rules and divergence measures:
Definition 5. An SPSR f (q; j) is effective with respect to divergence function d if for probability vectors p 1 , p 2 , q:
That is, when p 1 is "closer" according to d to the true probability q than p 2 is, then the expectation of scoring rule f (p, i) using true probability q is higher for p = p 1 than for p = p 2 . 
where the last inequality follows since by definition of closeness and the effectiveness relation between d and f , the bracketed term must be strictly positive for all respondents r, s, s ′ .
Friedman (1983) and Nau (1985) characterize scoring rules which are effective with respect to a metric d, including the well-known quadratic scoring and spherical scoring rules. In addition, it is easy to verify that the logarithmic scoring rule is effective with respect to d when d is defined as relative entropy (which is, however, not a metric). Thus, for two plausible divergence measures, the two most commonly used scoring rules can be used.
Alternative Methods
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature on mechanisms for eliciting non-verifiable opinions. . These methods either need to make distributional assumptions on the prior, or extract the prior using machine learning and they require large amounts of data.
More in the spirit of the current approach is the "Robust bayesian truth serum" (RBTS) of Witkowski and Parkes (2012a). RBTS can work in a setting with only 3 respondents. Its payment structure cleverly exploits the symmetry property of the quadratic scoring rule, but it works only in the binary setting. Furthermore, the payment rule of RBTS is quite complicated. In Baillon's (2017) "Bayesian market" answers to the MCQ and predictions by respondents are translated to buying and selling decisions, which may be more natural to respondents than engaging with scoring rules.
However, again, it works only with two possible answer options. The method by Radanovic and Faltings (2013) works for any number of possible answers and is mathematically simpler than both BTS and RBTS, but it requires an additional assumption on the information structure, namely, for each k, ℓ ∈ A with k ̸ = ℓ, y
k . Closest to choice-matching is the "minimum truth serum" suggested by Riley (2014) , and the "Divergence-based Bayesian truth serum" (DIV) of Radanovic and Faltings (2014) . Expressed in our notation, the former is given by the following payment formula:
where S is constructed from a strictly proper scoring rule f , as in choice-matching. However, the minimum truth serum is not always strictly incentive compatible without further assumptions on the updating process. 6 The DIV of Radanovic and Faltings (2014), in its "non-parametric" version, assigns a respondent r to two peer agents and penalizes r if one of the peers gives the same answer to the MCQ, while the other disagrees, and yet the prediction of the latter is closer to r's than the one of the former. DIV is incentive compatible under very similar conditions like the ones we have stated in subsection 3.4.
Choice-matching has an advantage in implementation: the score for the type-declaration does not depend on the respondent's prediction (the mechanism is decomposable, as defined in Radanovic and Faltings, 2013 ). Therefore, it is possible to let some respondents decide whether or not to make a prediction, as proposed by Riley (2014) . We can redefine the matching trigger such that for each answer option i ∈ A, there is a respondent s ̸ = r who answers i and submits a prediction.The respondents who decide to submit a type declaration only, will receive the score λS (x r ), provided that the (redefined) event M r occurs. To ensure that respondents still maximize their expected score by submitting a prediction, it is sufficient to choose a scoring rule with a positive lower bound to construct S. This construction allows respondents to skip the prediction question if they prefer to do so, while leaving the truth-telling incentives of the remaining respondents intact -as long as they believe M r occurs with positive probability.
A further implication is that a planner may decide to not even ask some respondents for a prediction, once enough predictions have been collected by previous respondents. This way, the planner can reduce the difficulty of the task of respondents who enter the survey at a later stage. These later responses can thus be collected in a faster manner and, consequently, at lower cost.
Choice-Matching Generalized
Making predictions about other respondents' answers is an attractive default for our auxiliary question. It gives rise to a plausible structure of beliefs which are sufficient for a truthful equilibrium. Furthermore, respondents can be paid as soon as all responses have been selected. However, on some occasions using predictions may not be ideal. First, it may be that the stochastic relevance of individual answer types is weak since the distribution of types in a population is well known, for instance if a survey asks respondents for their gender. Second, some respondents may have trouble understanding the payments made according to proper scoring rules. Finally, in some situations respondents could expect that the predictions of respondents with different answers to the MCQ will be more accurate. For instance, if a survey asks about field of study and highest attained degree, it may be optimal to report a PhD in quantitative social science. In this section, we show that there is a general principle behind choice-matching which can be employed by methods which do not rely on a prediction question.
To formalize the general principle, we first introduce real-valued utility-functions u k (y r , x −r , y −r ) for k ∈ A that depend on all variables except a respondent's type-declaration, x r . Since y r is not necessarily a prediction, we let the y-responses be taken from some general response set Ω.
Definition 6.
Let G be a (Bayesian) game given by the collection of the respondent set N , a set of potential type declarations A, a set of potential y-responses Ω, a prior P and utilities {u k } k∈A . The game G is type-separating if there is a profile σ such that for every respondent r and every k ∈ A:
In words, in a type-separating game there is a profile σ * (.) in which respondents declare their types truthfully (condition (i)) and in which respondents with identical answers give the same y-response and respondents with different answers give different y-responses (condition (ii)). Furthermore, this profile is an equilibrium (condition (iii)).
Importantly, this equilibrium is not strict in x r , since u (y r , x −r , y −r ) does not depend on x r at all.
As explained below in more detail, in our model from section 3 the type-separating game is the game induced by the prediction score alone.
type-separating game. Under assumptions A1-A2, any payment rule which induces a game
in case of M r , where λ ∈ (0, 1) and
and on the complement of M r :
is strictly incentive compatible.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the special case in section 3. The difference in expected utility for respondent r between non-deviation and deviating from t r to some other response x r with x r i = 1 is:
which gives the required result.
To make the proposition concrete, we first explain how it covers our model in section 3. In this model, the typeseparating game is based on the prediction score:
Given that all respondents report their answers honestly, it is a strict best response to set y r = y r,k , so that y
for all r and all k ∈ A, which makes the game induced by the prediction score a type-separating game. Under this definition, the function V (x r , y r , x −r , y −r ) from proposition 3 equals the payment rule of choice matching R ρ λ as defined in definition 3.
As an example of how choice-matching can be applied when the second question is not a prediction at all, consider again the example from section 2. As a reward for their participation in the product trial, each respondent could be allowed to participate in a "product lottery". First, they choose from a list of products the firm has already launched. If each star rating is chosen by one respondent other than r, respondent r receives the product they choose with probability λ and otherwise receive the product chosen by a respondent randomly selected among those giving the same star rating. simply indicates how much a respondent of type k values the product (so that it does not in fact depend on x −r and y −r ). If respondents then receive their own selection with probability λ and otherwise receive the selection of another respondent who gave the same rating, their expected utility equals the expression V (x r , y r , x −r , y −r ) from proposition 3. Thus, when the game induced by asking for a selection from the list is type separating, 7 the proposition tells us that the product lottery makes truth-telling a strict Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Using individual selections from a list as a type-separating game could find further applications in the study of decision-making under risk. These experiments usually let respondents choose among a variety of risky gambles, one of which is used to determine payments. Oftentimes, there is a final survey which asks about behavior outside the laboratory. For instance, the survey may ask which types of insurance a respondent possesses. While responses to such questions previously had to be taken at face value, choice-matching makes it possible to incentivize them by paying a respondent according to the gambles chosen by respondents who give the same answer to the survey question. This can make those answers more credible and allow more reliable inferences about the connection of behavior in-and outside the laboratory.
Proposition 3 also makes apparent that we could choose y r to be a prediction not about other respondents' type declarations, but about verifiable random variables. For example, suppose that the original MCQ asks respondent to rate the statement "the fiscal stimulus applied by the Obama administration since 2009 accelerated the recovery of the US economy after the subprime mortgage crisis" on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means strong disagreement and 5 means strong agreement. An auxiliary question could be a prediction about macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, interest rate or unemployment rate. Since the assessment of the fiscal stimulus should correspond to a specific macroeconomic view, respondents should plausibly expect that those respondents who evaluate the stimulus in the same manner, adhere to the "correct" macroeconomic conception and should therefore also be better forecasters of macroeconomic variables.
Relating to our discussion at the end of section 3, we can further see that we can reduce the burden on respondents by requesting predictions not about all possible answer options, but only over convenient subsets. In the example from section 2, the company could ask respondents to predict the shares of ratings higher and lower than 3 stars. This would not affect the choice-matching incentives.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a simple way to elicit honest responses from many agents to a multiple choice question, even if these answers cannot be verified and the planner has no prior knowledge about the distribution of honest answers in the population. Compared to alternative methods in the literature, our method is easy to explain to respondents. This is relevant from a practical standpoint: In empirical tests of the BTS, John et al. (2012) and Weaver and Prelec (2013), respondents were not informed about the payment structure but were only told that it was in their interest to be truthful. This has also been called the "intimidation method" (Frank et al., 2017) . While the black-box presentation mode in these studies did change the answer distribution, it is reasonable to assume that transparent methods will be even more effective. A further practical advantage of choice-matching is that part of the respondent pool (potentially the majority) only needs to answer one question. This is particularly helpful in the design of large-scale online incentive systems which currently rely on sophisticated machine learning techniques and non-transparent payment rules.
The practical features of choice-matching do not come at the cost of stronger assumptions on the underlying setting.
To the contrary, we have shown that our method is honesty-inducing under fairly general assumptions. It is only needed that the honest answers are informative and that the posteriors of respondents with the same honest answer to the MCQ have beliefs which are more similar to each other than the beliefs of respondents whose honest answer to the MCQ differs.
Using predictions may not be ideal when there is strong public information about the distribution of types, when respondents do not understand proper scoring rules well or when respondents may differ with regard to prediction accuracy for other reasons than the information contained in their answer type. In this case, the general principle behind choice-matching can still be applied, whenever there is a task which induces separation among the honest answers. We have illustrated potential applications in customer research or in risk studies. The general insight is that to design an incentive compatible reward scheme, the planner does not need to know which options respondents choose in the separating game, it is enough that she knows that separating strategies exist in order to align the game with the type declaration question.
While surveys have played a major role as a research tool in other social sciences, economists have traditionally been suspicious of stated preferences and beliefs since there are no consequences for responding dishonestly. However, it is often the case that these unverifiable variables, which can tap the expressive range of ordinary language, that are precisely the variables of interest. By linking stated to revealed preferences and beliefs our method erases, in principle, the methodological boundary between these two types of data.
Appendix
Budget-Balancing
Throughout our paper, we have assumed that individuals maximize their score individually and have no means of colluding with each other. This may seem problematic, because our method is susceptible to an attack, in which respondents agree on a response and then each make the same prediction. It can be verified straightforwardly that such collusion is even a strict Bayesian equilibrium.
It should be noted that our trigger device, conditioning the payment on the matching trigger M r , constitutes an impediment to such attacks since participants need to coordinate so that each answer is taken by at least two respondents.
Without the device, respondents could each report the exact same answer, making coordination much simpler.
Another way to make choice-matching more robust to collusion among all respondents is by using a budget-balanced version of it. We say that a scoring rule is budget-balanced if for any configuration of responses, the total score of respondents is zero. Given a choice-matching payment rule R, we define. . This does not affect incentives in a truthful equilibrium, because conditioning on E r , each respondent knows with certainty thatx k ≥ 1 N for all k. 9 For precise mathematical derivations, see Cvitaniȩt al (2017).
